Este artículo se ocupa del problema de cuál pueda ser la naturaleza de la creencia y cuál la mejor explicación de su normatividad. Se analizan diversas teorías que desarrollan el modelo ¿estado más contenido¿, y se presenta como alternativa una concepción de filiación wittgensteiniana que entiende la creencia como acción simbólica y expresiva. This paper is devoted to the question of the nature of belief, and what the best explanation of its normativity is. Several theories based on the model "state (...) plus content" are analysed, and is presented a wittgensteinianan conception which understands belief as symbolic and expressive action. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:The Phenomenology of Superstition or a Phenomenological Superstition?Elena Ibáñez-Guerra (bio)KeywordsBehaviorism, constructionism, intentionality, operant behaviorWhen the editors of Philosophy, Psychiatry, & Psychology asked me to make some brief comments on two articles for the special issue edited by Pérez-Álvarez and Sass, I was delighted to accept, thinking that the task would be a straightforward one, and that I could easily meet the agreed deadline. But nothing could be further from (...) the truth. The articles were of such density and their content of such profundity that it took months of interpretation and study, and of bringing my own knowledge up to date, before I was in a position to understand the concepts, adjust my beliefs, and make some comments. I could certainly have delivered some kind of eulogy about the brilliance of their content; I might have countered with my own article. However, what seemed most coherent to me was to meet their arguments head on and deal with what I consider to be their principal weaknesses, leaving the bouquets for the end.The articles set out, as I understand them and within the clinical context, to relate phenomenology, in its most traditional form, with the most current form of Skinnerian behaviorism, situating themselves in a contextualism that is, at the same time, close to and removed from the most radical type of social constructionism.But let us begin by looking more closely at “Phenomenology and Behaviorism.” It is novel for me, though Professor Pérez-Álvarez had already proposed it several years ago (Pérez-Álvarez 1992), to view operant behavior as intentionality, or at least as involving final causality according to the Aristotelian classification. It is a surprising contention, not least because, as I recall, Skinner lived in a time and a context (historical reason) in which the basic goal of psychology was to convert itself into a natural science, comparable in all respects to physics, which it took as a model, focusing therefore on efficient causality (also according to Aristotle’s terminology), so that behavior was considered as the immediate consequence of a stimulus, and the stimulus–response association became the cornerstone of the discipline. It is true that the operant behavior concept refers to the functional relationship between behavior and reinforcement, but it is no less true that Skinner’s definition of reinforcement is totally empirical—“all that which increases or decreases the probability”—meaning that reinforcement can be considered neither as a motive nor as a reason for behavior, unless it be in the eyes of the observer. [End Page 251]Furthermore, even though Yela (1987) refers to Ortega y Gasset’s formula “I am myself and my circumstances” as a Skinnerian approach, the truth is that Yela himself argues that it is precisely the self that constitutes personality, such that I have a personality because I am me, and not vice versa, as Skinner would appear to argue. In this regard, Ortega’s celebrated formula has generally been interpreted, from the most personalist perspectives, as “the circumstances are myself”—to highlight the denial of the psychological subject by radical behaviorism (Mischel’s [1968] criticism of the concept of personality is relevant here). On top of this, Skinner’s rejection of all that was not directly observable, or at least, that could not be operationalized, calls into question the admissibility of anything called final cause or intentionality of behavior. In his philosophy, all the indications are that contingencies are what determine behavior; and that there would be no room for a structural causality, as Althusser would argue, or of a reciprocal determinism, in Bandura’s terms, or even of an interaction between subject and environment, as modern interactionists would maintain. “I am myself and my circumstances” seems in Skinner to become “the circumstances are me”, and indeed, the reinforcement history – which in the article in question is considered as something akin to the Sartrian idea of “life project” – is for Skinner nothing more than a continuous association of events. In my view, Ortega’s perspectivism would perhaps be closer to the sociology of the American action theorists, Merton, Parsons, etc., than to Skinnerian behaviorism, since “action”—as the action theorists... (shrink)

Este artículo se ocupa del problema de cuál pueda ser la naturaleza de la creencia y cuál la mejor explicación de su normatividad. Se analizan diversas teorías que desarrollan el modelo ¿estado más contenido¿, y se presenta como alternativa una concepción de filiación wittgensteiniana que entiende la creencia como acción simbólica y expresiva.

Mi objetivo es dar algunas orientaciones sobre las revisiones que Husserl hizo de la epojé que había expuesto en las Ideas I. Este objetivo se enmarca en dos proyectos básicos, primero, la necesidad de hacer una lectura teleológica de Husserl; y, segundo, reivindicar lo que ahora se llama el “nuevo” Husserl. Para ello me centraré en algunas correcciones significativas introducidas por Husserl en Ideas I en los años 20, pero sobre todo en ciertos textos, algunos inéditos en 1972 cuando escribí (...) mi tesis de doctorado, pero ahora publicados. Me centraré especialmente en tres, dos de Erste Philosophie II, y otro de Hua XXXIV. Todo ello sirve como homenaje a Antonio Zirión por la traducción del tomo III de Husserliana que ha puesto a nuestro alcance en castellano.The aim of this paper is to provide a guide on the revisions Husserl made about the Epoché such as it was exposed in Ideas I. This goal falls into two basic projects, first, the need for a teleological reading of Husserl, and second, the claim of the now called “new” Husserl. To do this I will focus on some significant corrections made by Husserl in Ideas I in the twenties, but especially in certain texts, some unpublished in 1972 when I wrote my dissertation, but now published. I will focus especially on three, two of Erste Philosophie II, and other now published in Hua XXXIV. All this serves as a tribute to Antonio Zirión for the translation of Volume III of Husserliana that he has recently published in Spanish. (shrink)

Las primera de las conmemoraciones en torno al pensamiento del teólogo y filósofo español Francisco Suárez, que después serán repetidas de forma regular, se produjo en el ámbito académico occidental entorno a la celebración del tercer centenario de su muerte. La universidad de Munich rindió tributo con la publicación del volumen colectivo titulado P. Franz Suarez, S. I. De entre aquellas páginas hemos querido recuperar y adaptar a la lengua castellana el estudio del prestigioso medievalista Martin Grabmann. La referencia (...) a éste entre los especialistas en el pensamiento suareciano es un lugar común a la hora de precisar el carácter sintético y ecléctico de la obra metafísica de Suárez, así como para ilustrar la tesis de la penetración de sus ideas en el ámbito protestante. Es nuestra pretensión que la traducción que aquí presentamos auxilie tanto al historiador, a modo de recordatorio de un valor que generalmente no encuentra asiento en nuestros escritos ni en nuestras aulas, como al especialista, en la justa ponderación de sus rasgos y en especial, de su influencia. (shrink)

Mi ponencia trata de contribuir a una fenomenología de la percepción, desde la discusión de las posturas sobre la percepción que aparecen en la reciente obra de Lester Embree sobre el método fenomenológico. Desde el convencimiento y asentimiento a la llamada de Lester Embree, de que debemos volver a las cosas mismas, por tanto, dejamos de la erudición para alumbrar fenomenología de las cosas, no podemos tampoco desentendemos de lo que dicen nuestros maestros, y pretendo, con ellos, ir a las (...) cosas, para ver en qué medida la percepción como acceso al mundo es un “acto” en el que intervienen la experiencia directa sensible animal y la aportación lingüística que clasifica el mundo, sin por ello convertir la percepción en lenguaje. En el primer punto plantearé la importancia que el tema tiene en la fenomenología sobre todo por el planteamiento husserliana en las Ideas I. En el segundo veremos la postura de Lester Embree, para, en el tercero, exponer lo que yo creo que está implícito en la propuesta de Husserl, que explicita la percepción como el acceso ponente a la realidad, por tanto radicalmente vinculada a la creencia, de manera que, fenomenológicamente, percepción, creencia y realidad están vinculadas, siendo está vinculación el marco en el que sitúa el comienzo de la legitimidad racional. (shrink)

What is the relation between reasoning and self-knowledge? According to Shoemaker, a certain kind of reasoning requires self-knowledge: we cannot rationally revise our beliefs without knowing that we have them, in part because we cannot see that there is a problem with an inconsistent set of propositions unless we are aware of believing them. In this paper, I argue that this view is mistaken. A second account, versions of which can be found in Shoemaker and Byrne, claims that we can (...) reason our way from belief about the world to self-knowledge about such belief. While Shoemaker’s “zany argument” fails to show how such reasoning can issue in self-knowledge, Byrne’s account, which centres on the epistemic rule “If p, believe that you believe that p”, is more successful. Two interesting objections are that the epistemic rule embodies a mad inference and that it makes us form first-order beliefs, rather than revealing them. I sketch responses to both objections. ¿Qué relación existe entre el razonamiento y el autoconocimiento? Según Shoemaker, cierto tipo de razonamiento depende de un autoconocimiento: no podemos revisar nuestras creencias racionalmente sin saber que las tenemos, en parte porque no podemos ver que la inconsistencia de un conjunto de proposiciones constituye un problema a menos que estemos conscientes de creerlas. En el presente artículo argumento que esta propuesta es errónea. Una segunda posición, versiones de la cual se pueden encontrar en Shoemaker y Byrne proclama que es posible razonar desde creencias sobre el mundo hacia un autoconocimiento sobre tales creencias. Mientras el zany argument de Shoemaker no logra mostrar cómo tal razonamiento puede resultar en un autoconocimiento, la teoría de Byrne, que se centra en la regla epistémica “Si p, cree que crees que p” tiene más éxito. Dos objeciones interesantes son que la regla epistémica incorpora una inferencia insana y que nos hace formar creencias de primer orden, en lugar de revelarlas. Esbozo respuestas a ambas objeciones. (shrink)

Though 2023 marks the sixtieth anniversary of Dr. Martin Luther King Jr.’s iconic “I Have a Dream” speech, my reflections on the theme of the 2023 annual meeting of the Society of Christian Ethics, “Vision, Imagination, and Dreams in the Work of Ethics,” are inspired by King’s lesser known “Beyond Vietnam” speech. I connect my hopes for the future of Christian ethics to King’s still unrealized vision of social transformation. It is one where the US (and other empires) would (...) affirm—not subvert—each people’s right to self-determination and we scholar-activists would continue to search for connections between and among social issues even if others insist upon their discreteness. (shrink)

In this paper, I reconstruct Davidson’s explanation of first person authority and criticize it in three main points: (1) The status of the theory is unclear, given that it is phenomenologically inadequate. (2) The theory explains only that part of the phenomenon of first person authority which is due to the fact that no two speakers speak exactly the same idiolect. But first person authority might be a more far-reaching phenomenon than this. (3) Davidson’s argument depends on the claim that (...) “not getting one’s words wrong” is the same as “knowing what one’s words mean”. I argue that the two are not the same. In conclusion, I sketch some alternatives to Davidson’s account. I argue that the most promising one attempts to explain first person authority by examining how we acquire second-order beliefs. A well-known remark of Evans’s proves useful for such an account. (shrink)

El presente trabajo intenta introducir al lector en la problemática de la intersubjetividad desde la perspectiva fenomenológica-hermenéutica de Paul Ricoeur, atendiendo a la necesidad de las mediaciones simbólicas en el orden del reconocimiento. El fenómeno de la intersubjetividad será abordado aquí desde una perspectiva gnoseológica, ética, sociológica y hermenéutica, intentando desentrañar cómo es posible el reconocimiento mutuo entre subjetividades extrañas en un mundo común. Una reflexión sobre la intersubjetividad debe tener siempre presente la irreductibilidad de la persona como tal, reconocimiento (...) que es posible, en última instancia, por el amor y la caridad, el cual se manifiesta en la dinámica del intercambio de dones. Por otra parte, esta irreductibilidad de la persona supone el rechazo de la postulación de una tercera sustancia diferente del yo y del tú, que los subsumiera en su entidad, tal como parece suceder en el estructuralismo y en el hegelianismo. Es nuestra intención mostrar que se trata en Ricoeur de una fenomenología genética que rastrea lo extraño desde lo propio, teniendo como núcleo pivotante de su reflexión el homo capax que somos cada uno de nosotros y que actúa siempre en un mundo compartido (Lebenswelt). The present work pretends to be an introduction to the problem of intersubjectivity from the phenomenological and hermeneutical point of view of Paul Ricoeur. The phenomenon of intersubjectivity will be studied from a gnoseological, ethical, sociological and hermeneutical perspective, trying to disclose how a mutual acknowledgment between strange subjects in a common world can be possible. Meditation upon intersubjectivity must always attend on the irreductibility of persona as such, acknowledgment made possible by love and charity, and that reveals it sense in the espirit of giveness. In the other hand, the irreducitibility of persona implies rejecting the possibility of building a third substance, different from the I and the Thou, and which would submit them to its reality, as structuralism and hegelianism seems to propose. We intend to show that Ricoeur's position is one of a genetic phenomenology that search for the strange from the own, stating the homo capax that acts always in a shared world (Lebenswelt) as its central idea. (shrink)

Carlos Astrada’s early thought is characterized by a fundamental concern: the possibility, for human beings, of establishing new “ideals” and “values” capable of supplanting the old, capitalist ones. The aim of this article is to identify the different scopes of Astrada’s concept of ideal. In the first section, some bases to consider the philosophy of life underlying the Astradian theoretical proposals are established. The article will thereafter be divided into three other sections, which follow the chronology of Astrada’s works. In (...) the first part, the “ideal” is conceptually treated as an operative element in history, for which it is considered to what extent Jean-Marie Guyau would have influenced Astrada’s thought, something neglected by the existing literature. The second part deals with the relationship between the concepts of “ideal” and “life”. It will be shown how Astrada aimed to challenge the “idealist” and “empiricist” positions, which he considers equally unilateral to elaborate an ethics according to “the new times”. Astrada would have looked for an “intermediate position” between both perspectives, i.e., what he called “vital synthesis”. This could have been possible thanks to a philosophical dialogue with Georg Simmel, Manuel García Morente, José Ortega y Gasset, and Oswald Spengler. In the third part, the ideal is analyzed as an element capable of giving a guiding sense to the growing accumulation of human activities, marked by specialization, in an operation that can be interpreted under the romantic key of “recovering” the Totality. For this, the philosophical dialogue that Astrada had with both Georg Simmel and Rudolf Eucken is analyzed. (shrink)

The debate about Ortega’s relation to phenomenology has been continuous since the eighties of the last century. Before this date, Ortega’s manifestations that he had abandoned phenomenology at the same moment he came to know it were understood literally, without scrutinising other manifestations of his that he had made on phenomenology, or that his philosophy is similar to that of Husserl’s final works. Both manifestations seek to question the previous ones. The text clarifies first the meaning and importance of this (...) polemic for Spanish philosophy, deeply influenced by that of Ortega’s, and, secondly, I will set out what are the fundamental phenomenological concepts of Ortega’s philosophy. / El debate sobre la relación de Ortega con la fenomenología ha sido continuo desde los años ochenta del siglo pasado. Antes de esta fecha, las manifestaciones de Ortega de que había abandonado la fenomenología en el mismo momento que la conoció, fueron tomadas al pie de la letra, sin examinar otras manifestaciones que había hecho sobre la fenomenología, o la de que su filosofía es similar a la de los últimos trabajos de Husserl. Ambas manifestaciones buscan cuestionar las anteriores. El texto aclara en primer lugar el significado y la importancia de esta polémica en la filosofía española, profundamente influenciada por la de Ortega, y, en segundo lugar, se expondré cuáles son los conceptos fenomenológicos fundamentales de la filosofía de Ortega. (shrink)


Someone who believes “I believe it will rain” can easily be mistaken about the rain. But it does not seem likely, and might even be impossible, that he is wrong about the fact that he believes that it is going to rain. How can we account for this authority about our own beliefs – the phenomenon known as first person authority? In this paper I examine a type of theory proposed, in distinct forms, by Crispin Wright and Jane Heal for (...) an explanation of our authority. Both authors claim that our second-order beliefs (of the form “I believe that p”) are constitutive of the first-order beliefs that are self-ascribed in them (beliefs of the form “p”) and both try to derive the necessity of first person authority from this constitutive relation. My paper analyses and criticizes the two proposals and suggests a non-constitutive, alternative account of first person authority. (shrink)

En este trabajo trato de demostrar que Nino no logra articular un liberalismo completamente antiperfeccionista en su respuesta al comunitarismo. Para ello, parto de reconstruir el diagnóstico que Nino ofrece de la crítica comunitarista al liberalismo y señalo que para darle respuesta se compromete con una concepción particular del bien basada en la idea de autorrealización autónoma. En la siguiente sección desarrollo la manera en la que esa concepción del bien da forma al liberalismo de Nino y, en el apartado (...) siguiente, la confronto con un experimento mental destinado a evaluar si es capaz de bloquear distintas políticas estatales de corte perfeccionista. En la última sección ofrezco unas breves conclusiones respecto al modo en el que la adopción de una concepción del bien particular limita las pretensiones antiperfeccionistas de su teoría liberal. In this paper I attempt to prove that Nino does not succeed in developing a fully antiperfectionist account of liberalism as an answer to the communitarian challenge. I begin with a reconstruction of Nino’s diagnosis of the communitarian challenge to liberalism and point out that, in order to answer it he commits himself to a particular conception of the good based on the idea of autonomous self-realization. In the next section I develop the way by which that conception of the good shapes Nino’s liberalism. I further challenge his liberalism with a mental experiment designed to asses if it is capable of blocking several perfectionist State policies. In the last section I offer some brief remarks on the way the adoption of a particular conception of the good limits the antiperfectionist scope of Nino’s liberalism. (shrink)

There are many differences between the theories of Bentham and StuartMili specially in the ways in which both characterize the concept of pleasure.The concept, in turn, obviously has great influence on the utilitarian calculus. I am concemed in this paper with the issue of which of the two versions is most compatible with the liberal doctrine. In the procesa of establishing the compatibility of both versions with the liberal doctrine serious difficulties cannot be avoided, but this difficulties can be resolved (...) easily in Bentham's theory. This conclusion has been disputed from many quarters. Ronald Dworkin has raised objections to Bentham's theory from the point of view of liberalism while Jonathan Riley has attempted at building a liberal utilitarianism based-precisely- on Mill's theory. I set out to demostrate that Dworkin's objection may be overcome and I introduce, with purpose in mind, the concept of voluntarily accepted extemal reasons. 1 also believe that Riley's intent is doomed to fail, because it introduces elements of perfectionism and patemalism into the theory. (shrink)

In relation to the work of Ortega y Gasset, this paper aims to spotlight the importance that the reader plays in the construction of meaning of all philosophical text, beyond that marginal role it has been given in our culture. I will also try to make a critical analysis about that perspective of the didactic or pedagogical explanation towards the reader with which the literary factor of Ortega’s work has traditionally been interpreted.

A partir de la afirmación en la que Ortega dice que el científico se aloja en el ser humano, el texto pretende, por un lado y desde una perspectiva fenomenológica, abordar el vínculo entre las ciencias naturales y las ciencias humanas y sociales y, por otro lado, analizar las consecuencias de las maneras en las que estos dos grupos de ciencias se han relacionado a fin de imaginar la posición que tanto las ciencias naturales como las humanas y sociales deben (...) ocupar. From a phenomenological perspective and begining with the statement from Ortega saying that a scientist lives inside a human being, this text has a twofold structure. First, the author analyzes the relationship among natural sciences and human and social sciences. Second, the author analyzes the consequences of the different ways in which bothsciences have interrelated, in order to imagine the place that either natural sciences, and social sciences and humanities, should occupy. (shrink)

A is for Alice and astronomers arguing about acceleration -- B is for Bernard's body-exchange machine -- C is for the Catholic cannibal -- D is for Maxwell's demon -- E is for evolution (and an embarrassing problem with it) -- F is for the forms lost forever to the prisoners of the cave -- G is for Galileo's gravitational balls -- H is for Hume's shades -- I is for the identity of indiscernibles -- J is for Henri Poincaré (...) and alternative geometries -- K is for the Kritik and Kant's kind of thought experiments -- L is for Lucretius' spear -- M is for Mach's motionless chain -- N is for Newton's bucket -- O is for Olbers' paradox -- P is for Parfit's person -- Q is for the questions raised by thought experiments quotidiennes -- R is for the rule-ruled room -- S is for Salvatius' ship, sailing along its own space-time line -- T is for the time-travelling twins -- U is for the universe, and Einstein's attempts to understand it -- V is for the vexed case of the violinist -- W is for Wittgenstein's beetle -- X is for xenophanes and thinking by examples -- Y is for counterfactuals and a backwards approach to history -- Z is for Zeno and the mysteries of infinity. (shrink)

One of the protagonists of the darwinist controversy in the Canary Islands (Spain), during the Nineteenth Century, was the advocate and teacher Rafael Lorenzo y García. In this paper, I show his original thought, until now unknown, against the classical darwinism and next to the fixism.Moreover I analyse the philosophical and natural constants in his Estudios filosóficos (1876 y 1877).

The study aim was 2-fold (i) to describe and compare the in-season variations of acute: chronic workload ratio (ACWR) coupled, ACWR uncoupled, and exponentially weighted moving average (EWMA) through session-rated perceived exertion (s-RPE), total distance (TD), high-speed running distance (HSRD), and sprint distance across different periods of a professional soccer season (early, mid, and end-season) between starters and non-starters; (ii) to analyze the relationship the aforementioned measures across different periods of the season for starters and non-starters. Twenty elite soccer players (...) (mean ± SD age, 29.4 ± 4.4 y; height, 1.8 ± 0.1 m; and body mass, 74.8 ± 2.3 kg). They were divided into starter and non-starter groups and were evaluated for 20 weeks. ACWR had general changes throughout the season. At the beginning and end of the mid-season, the highest ACWR was observed in three parameters: s-RPE, TD, and HSRD. ACWR and EWMA through sprint distance were higher at the beginning of the early-season than at any other time of the season.The ACWR coupled of s-RPE shows a significant higher value for non-starters than starters (p = 0.015;g = −1.01 [−1.98, −0.09]) and the ACWR coupled of TD shows a significant higher value for starters than non-starters in early-season (p < 0.01;g = 3.01 [1.78, 4.46]) and shows a significant higher value for non-starters than starters in mid-season (p < 0.01;g = −2.52 [−3.83, −1.39]), and end-season (p < 0.01;g = −2.57 [−3.89, −1.43]). While the EWMA of TD shows a significant higher value for starters than non-starters in early-season (p < 0.01;g = 2.25 [1.17, 3.49]) and mid-season (p < 0.01;g = 2.42 [1.31, 3.71]), and shows a significant higher value for non-starters than starters in end-season (p < 0.01;g = −2.23 [−3.47, −1.16]). Additionally, we found some correlations between external and internal load measures during three periods of the in-season. The study’s main finding was that the indexes of ACWR and EWMA were useful to detect differences between period and between playing status with the exception for the sprint variable. In addition, the necessary work for non-starter players’ improvement is not done during training, and these players lose their readiness as the season progresses. Consequently, these players perform poorly during the match. Therefore, coaches and their staff should consider devising new activities to keep non-starter players physically fit. This deficit must be accounted for in training because they compete in fewer matches and have less burden than starters. (shrink)

Como en la psicología del individuo, en la pólis se encuentran dos principios contrapuestos, las pasiones y la ley. En los animales gregarios existe también el factor político que lleva a trabajar a muchos por un fin común. Pero en el hombre hay una diferencia en su actividad política, es decir, la ley que proviene de la razón y que no se puede expresar sin palabras. Por ello Aristóteles, a diferencia de Platón, otorga una función constructiva a los sofistas, como (...) técnicos de la retórica que es necesaria para establecer la ley en la ciudad. La política es la ciencia superior que articula la ética y la retórica para que los hombres en la ciudad puedan llegar al fin último, la felicidad. No hay, para Aristóteles, un fin exterior metapolítico, que pueda satisfacer separadamente los componentes superiores de la psyché humana. As on a person’s psychology, there are in the pólis two opposing principles, passions and law. In gregarious animals, there is also a political factor that leads many individuals to work for a common purpose. But in man there is a difference in his political activity, i.e., the law that comes from reason and cannot be expressed without words. For this reason, Aristotle, unlike Plato, gives a constructive function to Sophists, as experts on rhetoric, which is necessary to establish law in the city. Politics is a superior science that articulates ethics and rhetoric in order that men in the city can reach the ultimate goal, happiness. For Aristotle, there is not an external metapolitical objective, which could separately satisfy the upper components of the human psyche. (shrink)

El autor de este artículo lee el Apologeticum de Tertuliano como un texto de transición ideológica entre los primeros escritos mesiánicos del cristianismo y la teología política del siglo IV, i.e. una obra que fusiona teología imperial y cristianismo. Dejando de lado las disputas teológicas con el judaísmo, Tertuliano propone una discusión frontal con los romanos sobre la relación del concepto de divinidad con el poder político y quiere mostrar que la teología y la ética de los cristianos son mucho (...) más apropiadas para una realidad como el Imperio romano que las que ha impuesto la tradición politeísta. En este razonamiento se destaca la correspondencia entre monoteísmo y monarquía universal. The author of this paper reads Apologeticum by Tertullian as a text of ideological transition between the early messianic Christian writings and political fourth century theology, i.e. a work that combines Imperial theology and Christianity. Leaving apart the theological disputes with Judaism, Tertullian proposes a frontal discussion with the Romans on the relationship of the concept of divinity with political power and wants to show that theology and Christian ethics are much more appropriate for a reality as Roman Empire which has imposed the polytheistic tradition. His argumentation stands out the reciprocation between monotheism and universal monarchy. (shrink)

ResumenEl objetivo de este artículo es demostrar que la doctrina kantiana del esquematismo trascendental trata una problemática ontológica. Con ese fin, en primer lugar, estudiamos las relaciones entre categorías, esquemas y principios del entendimiento. De esta manera señalamos la íntima relación entre los esquemas y los principios. En segundo lugar, mostramos que el sistema de los principios del entendimiento puede entenderse como un tratado de ontología. En tercer lugar, presentamos y criticamos un grupo de interpretaciones semánticas del esquematismo trascendental.Palabras claveKant, (...) filosofía trascendental, esquematismo, ontología.Abstract The aim of this paper is to demonstrate that the Kantian doctrine of transcendental schematism deals with an ontological problematic. With this purpose in mind, in the first place, I study the relationships between categories, schemata and principles of understanding. In this way I point out the close relationship between schemata and principles. In the second place, I demonstrate that the system of the principles of understanding can be conceived as an ontological treatise. In the third place, I present and review a group of semantic interpretations of transcendental schematism.KeywordsKant, transcendental philosophy, schematism, ontology. (shrink)

Davidson claims that a creature that has spent its entire life in isolation cannot have thoughts. His two reasons for this claim are that interaction with another creature is required to locate the cause of the creature's responses, and that linguistic communication is necessary to acquire the concept of objective truth, which is itself required in order to have thoughts. I argue that, at best, these two reasons imply that in order to have thoughts a creature must be capable of (...) participating in triangulation, not that it must have already participated in triangulation. I then argue that triangulation doesn't solve the ambiguity problem; that is, it doesn't entail that a being's thoughts and utterances are about distal objects rather than proximal patterns of stimulation. Fortunately, ambiguity, like other forms of indeterminacy, doesn't entail that we cannot have thoughts. /// Davidson afirma que una criatura que ha pasado su vida entera aislada no puede tener pensamientos. Aduce dos razones para esto: que se requiere la interacción con otra criatura para localizar la causa de las respuestas de la criatura, y que la comunicación lingüística es necesaria para adquirir el concepto de verdad objetiva, que a su vez es necesario para tener pensamientos. Argumento que, en el mejor de los casos, estas dos razones implican que para tener pensamientos una criatura debe ser capaz de participar en una triangulacion, no que ya debe haber participado en ella. Arguyo, además, que la triangulación no resuelve el problema de la ambigüedad, esto es, no implica que lo que un ser piensa y dice sea acerca de objetos distantes, más que de patrones de estimulacion próximos. Por fortuna, la ambigiiedad, como otras formas de indeterminación, no implica que no podamos tener pensamientos. (shrink)

Cuando se leen los relatos que los grandes santos hacen de su experiencia de Dios, encontramos expresiones que rompen las reglas de la lógica lingüística, prueba de que hay experiencias que no son fáciles de describir y transmitir. San Agustín, en el contexto de una de las más célebres páginas de sus Confesiones, esa en la que exclama: “Tarde te amé, hermosura tan antigua y siempre nueva”, dice, por una parte, que Dios está “dentro” de él, para añadir a renglón (...) seguido que las cosas están dentro de Dios, pues si no estuvieran en él, no serían . En San Pablo encontramos expresiones similares: por una parte, se puede leer en sus cartas que “Cristo vive en mí” , y por otra, el autor de los Hechos de los Apóstoles pone en su boca que “en Dios vivimos, nos movemos y somos” . Este doble modo de concebir la relación de Dios con la realidad creada, con el cosmos y con el ser humano, resulta paradójico y es una provocación para el pensamiento.¿Dios está en la realidad, se hace presente en ella de algún modo, o es más bien la realidad la que está en Dios? Posiblemente no hay contradicción entre ambas imágenes, sino complementariedad. Tomás de Aquino, como veremos, afirma las dos cosas. Dios es de una naturaleza tal que, por una parte puede hacerse presente en la realidad mundana y humana y, por otra, llevar dentro de sí estas mismas realidades. ¿Hay alguna analogía, alguna imagen que pueda servir para describir una naturaleza así y ayudarnos a comprender mejor el ser divino? En definitiva, ¿qué significa “estar en” o “dentro de” las criaturas por parte de Dios y en o dentro de Dios por parte de las criaturas? ¿Se trata de simples imágenes o estas imágenes son modelos que tienen alguna correspondencia con la realidad?When you read the accounts that the great saints do of their experience of God, you find expressions that break the rules of linguistic logic, what proves that there are experiences not easy to describe and transmit. St Augustine in the context of one of the most known pages of his Confessions, where he exclaims: “Late have I loved you, beauty so ancient and so new”, says that God is inside him and adds immediately after that things are inside God, since if things were not in him they wouldn’t exist. We find similar expressions in St Paul: On the one hand, one can read in one of his letters: “Christ lives in me”, on the other hand, the author of the Acts of the Apostles puts in his mouth: “in God we live and move and have our being” . This double way of understanding God’s relation to created things, the cosmos and human beings, is paradoxical and becomes a provocation to reason.Is God inside reality, is he present in it someway, or is rather reality which is in God? Possibly there is not contradiction between the two images, but they complement each other. Thomas Aquinas, as we’ll see later, states the two. God is such a nature, that, on the one hand, he can be present in wordly and human reality, on the other hand, he can contain inside himself these realities. Is there any analogy, any image able to describe a nature like this that could help us to understand better his divine being? In short, what does it mean to be in or inside the creatures in relation to God and to be in or inside God in relation to creatures? Is it about simple images or these images are models with some relation to reality? (shrink)

El materialismo de la Edad Moderna nos describe al hombre como una máquina, comparable a un complejo artilugio mecánico. Cabe entonces imaginar que una máquina no-biológica pueda constituir un ser pensante como lo son los seres humanos, e incluso cabría pensar en la posibilidad de codificación de una mente humana real para su posterior trasvase a un sustrato artificial. Considero que estas últimas posiciones son más propias de la cultura friki o de amantes de la ciencia ficción que de una (...) cultura humanista seria. En cualquier caso, una cosa parece clara: la simulación por ordenador de cualquier tipo de materia no es la materia misma. Una simulación por ordenador de una estrella no emite luz ni calor, y del mismo modo tampoco ofrece calor humano (en términos materiales) ni voluntad de vivir una máquina que hipotéticamente pueda contener toda la información sobre el ser humano y simular sus respuestas. -/- English translation: The materialism of the Modern Age describes human beings as machines, comparable to complex mechanical devices. It is then possible to imagine that a non-biological machine can constitute a thinking being as humans are, and one could even think of the possibility of coding a real human mind for its subsequent transfer to an artificial substrate. I think that these latter positions are more typical of the geek culture or of science fiction lovers than of a serious humanist culture. In any case, one thing seems clear: the computer simulation of any type of matter is not the matter itself. A computer simulation of a star does not emit light or heat, and likewise a machine that hypothetically can contain all the information about a human being and simulate his/her responses offers neither human heat (in material terms) nor will to live. (shrink)

El objetivo del artículo es reflexionar sobre el concepto de revuelta popular para precisar su valor heurístico en relación con la comunidad política. Para ello se realiza un recorrido teórico de la idea de revuelta popular en algunos textos de Arendt, Rancière, Blanchot, Nancy, Agamben y Esposito. Propongo que la revuelta debe ser entendida en el marco de una ontología de la comunidad. Se concluye que la revuelta popular supone el rechazo de un orden de desigualdad sostenido en un desacuerdo (...) y la exigencia de no perder la comunidad entendida como el lugar mismo de nuestra existencia. The aim of this paper is to reflect on the concept of popular revolt in order to clarify its heuristic value in relation to political community. The essay traces a theoretical trajectory of the idea of popular revolt in some texts of Arendt, Rancière, Blanchot, Nancy, Agamben and Esposito. I propose that popular revolt must be understood in the context of an ontology of the community. I conclude that popular revolt presumes the rejection of an order on inequality sustained by a disagreement and the requirement of not to lose the community understood as the very place of our existence. (shrink)

En este trabajo me propongo desarrollar un estudio crítico de la concepción mecanicista de la explicación científica. En primer lugar, argumento que la caracterización mecanicista de los modelos fenoménicos (no explicativos) es inadecuada, pues no ofrece un análisis aceptable de los conceptos de modelo científico y similitud, que son fundamentales para la propuesta. En segundo lugar, sostengo que la caracterización de los modelos mecanicistas (explicativos) es igualmente inadecuada, pues los análisis disponibles de la relación explicativa de relevancia constitutiva implican una (...) tesis metafísica que es rechazada por los mismos mecanicistas. Concluyo que el mecanicismo no ofrece todavía una elucidación aceptable de la explicación científica. In this paper, I offer a critical assessment of the mechanicist approach to scientific explanation. Firstly, I argue that the mechanicist characterization of (non explanatory) phenomenological models is inadequate, since it does not develop an explication of the concepts of scientific model and similarity, which are indispensable to the approach. Secondly, I claim that the mechanicist conception of (explanatory) mechanicist models is inadequate as well, since all the available analices of the explanatory relation of constitutive relevance imply a metaphysical thesis that is rejected by the mechanicists themselves. I conclude that mechanicism needs to be emended if it aims to be considered as a genuinely illuminating approach to scientific explanation. (shrink)

Ante ciertos modelos causales del agente libre inspirados en Tomás de Aquino, resulta interesante atender al modelo causal presentado por Tomás mismo, especialmente en un texto a partir del cual se puede rastrear la exposición de la acción libre como el efecto de los cuatro sentidos causales aristotélicos. Se trata de la cuestión sobre los actos imperados (ST I–II, q. 17); en cuyos primeros cuatro artículos –y en sus textos paralelos– determina que la voluntad es causa agente; la razón práctica, (...) causa ordenadora; y el imperium de ambas (razón y voluntad) se relaciona con el acto imperado como lo formal con lo material. (shrink)

Purpose of this paper is to present how Schiller, Herder and Novalis address the question of emancipation. I will start setting out the specifically modern problems, which those thinkers confronted, characterized by the mechanistic metaphysics, the positive religion and the socio-political fragmentation; secondly, I will analyze the Kantian perspective on practical reason in its emancipating dimension, that is, as a critical negation of the conditioned nature of empirical world; finally, I will outline the main ideas of a philosophy of emancipation (...) in the theoretical work of Schiller, Herder and Novalis. (shrink)

Alex Byrne and Jordi Fernández propose two different versions of a transparency theory of self-knowledge. According to Byrne, we self-attribute beliefs by an inference from what we take to be facts about the world (following a rule he calls BEL). According to Fernández, we self-attribute the belief that p on the basis of a prior mental state, a state which constitutes our grounds for the belief that p (thereby realizing a procedure he calls Bypass). In this paper, I present the (...) two theories in outline and discuss various objections concerning their normative (Can the procedure give us knowledge?) and metaphysical aspects (Is the procedure functional?). I conclude that especially the metaphysical objections against Bypass are somewhat more difficult to counter than those against BEL and that the modifications required of Fernández’s theory make it very similar to Byrne’s. -/- Alex Byrne y Jordi Fernández proponen dos diferentes versiones de la teoría de la transparencia del autoconocimiento. Según Byrne, para autoatribuir creencias inferimos qué es lo que creemos a partir lo que tomamos como hechos sobre el mundo (siguiendo una regla que Byrne llama BEL). Según Fernández, autoatribuimos la creencia de que p con base en un estado anterior a esta creencia, un estado que fundamenta la creencia de que p (realizando un procedimiento que él llama Bypass). En este artículo expongo las dos teorías y discuto objeciones que conciernen su aspecto normativo (¿puede el procedimiento darnos conocimiento?) y metafísico (¿es funcional el procedimiento?). Concluyo que en especial las objeciones metafísicas son más graves en el caso de Bypass que en el de BEL y que las modificaciones requeridas de la teoría de Fernández la asemejan mucho a la de Byrne. (shrink)

What does environmental ethics have to say about the urban context? Is the city an environment that has only negative value or is it possible, and in fact necessary, to develop ethical recommendations about how to design it? In this paper, I argue for the second of these disjuncts and sketch some ideas for an environmental city ethics. I try to show that the most important principle of such an ethics is procedural: anyone affected by a decision about the urban (...) environment must have the possibility to participate in the process of making it. This principle has certain preconditions and there are also limitations on its applicability. For example, it is plausible that there are certain ecocentric ethical obligations, which are valid independently of the implementation of the principle. I sketch an idea for how a city’s green areas can help to raise citizens’ awareness of these obligations. -/- ¿Qué se puede decir, desde la ética ambiental, acerca del contexto urbano? ¿Se trata de un ambiente únicamente con valor negativo o es posible, e incluso necesario, desarrollar recomendaciones éticas sobre cómo diseñarlo? En este texto argumento en favor de la segunda afirmación y esbozo algunas ideas respecto de una ética ambiental para la ciudad. Defiendo que el principio más importante es procedimental: toda persona afectada debe tener la posibilidad de participar en la toma de las decisiones sobre el ambiente urbano. Este principio tiene ciertas precondiciones y también algunas restricciones. Por ejemplo, es plausible pensar en obligaciones éticas ecocéntricas válidas independientemente de la implementación del principio. Esbozo cómo las áreas verdes de una ciudad pueden ayudar a sensibilizar a los citadinos con estas obligaciones. (shrink)

L'objectif de cette these est d'etudier les fondements empiriques de notions semantiques telles que la signification, l'analyticite et la reference. J'essaie entre autres choses de defendre l'idee qu'il n'existe pas de critere permettant de definir strictement ces notions. Dans un premier temps, j'examine les critiques formulees par W. V. Quine contre la distinction analytique-synthetique. Il n'existe pas d'argument general pour rejeter cette distinction. Pour critiquer celle-ci, on doit examiner individuellement les diverses tentatives visant a l'etablir. ;Tout d'abord, j'examine les objections (...) de Quine contre le point de vue selon lequel la distinction analytique-synthetique aurait un caractere fondationnel. Ces objections sont rapprochees du paradoxe sceptique de Ludwig Wittgenstein, qui concerne le concept normatif de signification, selon lequel la signification d'un enonce justifierait son usage. ;J'aborde ensuite la question de savoir s'il est possible de tracer la distinction analytique-synthetique dans le cadre d'une theorie verificationniste de la signification, qui est fondee sur la maniere dont les locuteurs s'y prennent pour etablir la verite de leurs enonces. Une telle approche ne permet pas d'assigner aux enonces theoriques une signification determinee a cause du holisme, qui affirme que les enonces theoriques ne sont pas liees individuellement aux experiences qui les confirment , mais seulement en tant que fragments plus ou moins importants de theorie. Je tente de clarifier la these du holisme, et en etudie la source. ;Je presente ensuite le compte rendu de la signification propose par Quine, qui est fonde sur l'experience de pensee de la traduction radicale. Un manuel de traduction radicale doit organiser les donnees empiriques a partir desquelles il est construit, i.e. les dispositions verbales des locuteurs, conformement a certaines contraintes comme la contrainte de la communaute et le principe de charite. J'explique comment ces contraintes doivent etre comprises et appliquees. Le compte rendu de Quine est compare et contraste a celui de Donald Davidson, qui presente plusieurs points en commun. J'examine les principales differences qui les separent et essaie d'en decouvrir les motivations. Je montre par exemple pourquoi la theorie distale de Davidson est preferable a la theorie proximale de Quine. ;Enfin, la these de l'indetermination de la traduction est presentee. Je propose une formulation de cette these, selon laquelle l'indetermination de la traduction est directement liee a l'absence de critere empirique permettant de tracer la distinction analytique-synthetique. J'illustre ensuite cette these au moyen d'exemples et examine certaines de ses consequences, qui n'ont pas toutes ete envisagees par Quine, notamment celles qui concernent la notion de contenu empirique. (shrink)

Resumen En este trabajo intentaré comparar dos momentos en la producción teórica de Nancy Fraser: sus análisis contemporáneos del capitalismo como orden institucional y su marco categorial previo, basado en dualismo de redistribución y reconocimiento. Destacaré tres grandes rupturas en su evolución intelectual: en el diagnóstico del presente, en la comprensión del capitalismo como tal y en la propuesta política.In this paper I will try to compare two periods in Nancy Fraser's theoretical evolution: her analysis of contemporary capitalism as an (...) institutional social order and her previous categorial framework, based on the dualims of redistribution and recognition. I will highlight three major ruptures in her intellectual development: in the diagnosis of present times, in the understanding of capitalism as such and in political proposal. (shrink)

La obra de Julia V. Iribarne se basa, entre otros, en tres conceptos centrales, intersubjetividad trascendental, ética trascendental y antropología trascendental. En este texto de homenaje a su persona y a su trayectoria intelectual, dado que nuestra autora se basa fundamentalmente en los inéditos de Husserl, aclararé, en primer lugar la posición del legado póstumo [Nachlass] husserliano en la obra de este. A continuación dedicaré un apartado a exponer el desarrollo de cada uno de esos conceptos a lo largo de (...) su trayectoria, desde la intersubjetividad, pasando por la ética, hasta antropología trascendental.Julia V. Iribarne’s lifework rests, among others, on three central concepts, transcendental intersubjectivity, transcendental ethics and transcendental anthropology. In this text in tribute to her person and intellectual trajectory, and because Julia V. Iribarne’s writings are founded basically on Husserl’s Nachlass, I shall first clarify my conception about the relation of this Nachlass to his work. Next I will dedicate a section to explain the development of each of the concepts throughout her career, from intersubjectivity,, to ethics and to transcendental anthropology. (shrink)

El ensayo trata de presentar la fenomenología de los actos racionales, actos que son fundamentales, en todo caso, para la ciencia. En la primera parte se expone la fenomenología de la razón tal como aparece en la cuarta sección del libro de Husserl Ideas I. En la segunda parte, teniendo a la vista El origen de la geometría, se expone esa fenomenología de la razón aplicada a la explicación de la ciencia histórica, superando el relativismo en que se ve envuelta, (...) superación que también vale para la antropología cultural. Si en la primera parte se desvela la razón como legitimidad de lo que se da en sí mismo, en la segunda se expone la importante elucidación del apriori de la historia con el que cuenta el historiador y frente al cual nada puede el relativismo. Como conclusión se explica de qué manera incide la fenomenología de la razón de la primera parte en las ciencias humanas.The essay tries to present the phenomenology of rational acts, acts that are fundamental, in any case, for science. In the first part the phenomenology of reason is exposed as it appears in the fourth section of Husserl's book Ideas I. In the second part, considering The Origin of Geometry, this phenomenology of reason applied to explanation of historical science, overcoming the relativism in which it is involved, an overcoming that also applies to cultural anthropology. If in the first part reason is revealed as the legitimacy of what is given in itself, in the second part the important elucidation of the apriori of history is exposed with which the historian must count and against which relativism can do nothing. As a conclusion, it is explained how the phenomenology of reason of the first part affects the human sciences. (shrink)

Es mi homenaje a Melchor Cano, el teólogo dominico que teologizó siempre con autoridad. Siguió en esto y en su estilo humanístico a su venerado Maestro, Francisco de Vitoria. Trato de la época anterior a su profesorado salmantino. Lo mío es el pedestal sobre el que se apoyará su apoteosis, que estará en: la cátedra de Prima de Teología de Salamanca, el concilio de Trento, el asesoramiento como consejero de Felipe II, los Lugares Teológicos. Lo mío es, pues, el lugar (...) que lo vio nacer, la formación salmantina como dominico, la coronación de su formación teológica y primer profesorado en el Colegio de San Gregorio de Valladolid, y su irradiación desde la cátedra principal de teología en la universidad de Alcalá. It is my homage to Melchior Cano, the Dominican theologian who always taught theology with authority. He followed his venerate master Francisco de Vitoria. I am talking of the previous time to his teaching at Salamanca. My intention is to show the pedestal on which his apotheosis will stand: the theological chair of Prima at Salamanca, the Council of Trent, the advice as Philip II’ counselor, the theological places as well as the place where he was born, his education in Salamanca, as a Dominican, the culmination of his theological education, his first teaching at St. Gregory’s college at Valladolid and his irradiation from the main theological chair at Alcala University. (shrink)